Repo Markets and Financial Instability

The repo markets are fueling the fires again.

Repurchase agreements ("repos") are the sale of securities combined with an agreement for the seller to buy back the securities at a later date, or a cash financing transaction combined with a forward contract. The duration of the agreement can be overnight, term or open. They are heavily used by investment firms to obtain short-term financing that can be rolled over; common financing aims are for longer-maturity, higher-yielding securities to juice the yield spread. Collateral for repo trades include sovereign debt (e.g., Treasuries), agency debt (e.g., Fannie/Freddie or GSE debt), or mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The Federal Reserve also uses repos to inject or withdraw money into/from bank reserves and the money supply, with Treasuries serving as usual collateral.

As the curves above show, the repo market size just among U.S. Primary Dealers had grown geometrically in the last decade, until choking following the 2007-8 credit markets seizure. It is worthwhile to note that the growth and decline of these markets correlates with the growth and decline of collateralized debt obligation (CDO) issuance, the same asset and mortgage-backed derivative security that provided a significant contribution to the counterparty risks leading to the credit markets seizure. CDOs were a structured hodgepodge of good and bad mortgage and asset-backed debt, and given a AAA rating from credit rating agencies, making them eligible as collateral for repo transactions, and attractive for their yield. When default rates picked up in 2006-7, the values of CDOs plummeted, and triggered a margin call nightmare that eventually doomed both Bear Stearns and Lehman. The fallout also affected AIG, who sold cheap CDO insurance in the form of credit default swaps (CDS) to CDO buyers, without recognizing the risks should those CDOs implode. The repo markets made most of this "Ponzi finance" of CDOs possible.

It may not be a surprise then that the recent failure of yet another large brokerage firm and primary dealer (MF Global) involved a sizable ($7.6B in March 2011) repo trade with European sovereign debt as collateral. Though MF Global structured the trade such that the maturity of the repo equaled the duration of the European bonds pledged as collateral, thereby seemingly reducing its duration mismatch risk, the firm off-loaded the collateral from its balance sheet as part of the accounting for the repo sale, and in doing so summarily avoided capital cushions to cover shortfalls should that debt lose value until maturity. As the Euro debt crisis heated up this fall, MF Global started getting a barrage of margin calls, then credit downgrades, and then more margin calls. It failed to survive this liquidity thrashing, seeking bankruptcy protection on Halloween. Lehman succumbed to similar fate, and has been accused of employing repo transactions as accounting maneuvers to manipulate its financial reports and leverage, using the funds from repo sales to temporarily pay down debt before repurchasing the collateral ("Repo 105").

To be sure, many repo transactions are used responsibly and legitimately, just as firms responsibly and legitimately use interest rate swaps to hedge interest rate risk. The problem arises when the underlying collateral of the repo trade sharply loses value, and the seller counterparty doesn't have enough capital to survive margin calls and credit downgrades.

The financial instability caused by the exploitation of the repo markets to finance the debt market growth cannot be overlooked, though regulators (Federal Reserve, SEC, et al.) have consistently ignored this major weak point. The worst manifestation of this systemic problem is when such debt market growth leads to "Ponzi finance," a term coined by Hyman Minsky in his classification of financial instability. It is so defined: "expected income flows will not even cover interest cost, so the firm must borrow more or sell off assets simply to service its debt. The hope is that either the market value of assets or income will rise enough to pay off interest and principal." This is precisely what occurred to mortgage and asset-backed debt during the housing boom-turned-bust, as subprime lenders accelerated their loans to unworthy borrowers and sold such bad debt en masse to MBS and CDO packagers/issuers. Those CDOs turned out to contain enough bad debt to invalidate their AAA rating — a rating issued on the faulty basis that default risks were spread out when super-packaged with "good" debt into a structured CDO.

Banks and investment houses still rely too much on repo lines to fund their spread bets (i.e., a lousy business model that just keeps on kicking despite the "systemic risk" and Ponzi finance potential). When the underlying collateral starts to smell, the markets start to seize, and central bank swap lines start to swing. The Eurozone repo market in particular as reported by ICMA declined less than the U.S. repo market and remained elevated after 2008 - and sovereign government and RMBS issuances in Europe increased (see above curves). As already discussed, the growth in the U.S. repo market before 2008 was correlated to the increase in CDO and MBS/ABS issuances, many loaded with subprime "II" junk. Meanwhile global debt outstanding keeps increasing at a record pace.

The opacity of the repo financing markets is an issue that regulators and industry both have failed to address. In particular, the Federal Reserve (specifically the NY Fed) has failed to provide adequate transparency to the U.S. markets, even though it is increasingly charged with regulatory powers that would cover these markets. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recently provided a case to strengthen repo clearing and a liquidity/capital framework but certain elements in the system (namely large dealers who want to maintain market share and certain capital terms to draw business) are bucking any changes or improvements that would seek to avoid market seizures and instabilities. Jamie Dimon's rant over the Basel solution is such an example, and JP Morgan has among the largest U.S. market share of the tri-party repo market. Granted, the Basel solution may not be the panacea, but a sensible capital and margin framework and a push to standardized clearing would go a long way, as would market transparency. JPM's role in the MF Global failure ought to be reviewed, no doubt. Let's not forget that JPM was also the repo banker of Lehman and Bear.

The derivatives markets also have suffered from opacity, but in recent years coverage has dramatically improved of both cleared and over-the-counter (OTC) derivative statistics, thanks to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), DTCC, Tri-Optima, SIFMA, ISDA and other organizations and industry warehouses. In the case of repos, no organization tracks this market with the same level of detail; even accurate market size is not available from existing data [1]. DTCC has started to track a proprietary metric that measures the weighted average interest rate paid each day on General Collateral Finance (GCF) Repos based on U.S. government securities HERE, but not based on other collateral such as EU sovereigns, which has caused much recent consternation and contributed to the failure of MF Global.

Regulators and regulations were not the answer to the repo financing/debt market growth financial instability weak point. Regulators missed Lehman and they missed MF Global. Time after time, financial participants look to arbitrage (avoid) regulatory requirements through creative use of financial products and accounting, and they will continue to do so as avenues are closed, and others opened through "financial innovation" (and sheer desperation for yield and return). I submit that there are three solutions to mitigate this:

• For industry and regulators to provide as much transparency of the repo, debt and derivatives markets as possible, so market participants can gauge exuberant growth and start to correct it through markets before unstable levels are reached;
• Letting firms that abuse financing lines to juice yields or manipulate leverage and capital ratios FAIL, even if they are listed as "systemically important" or "too big to fail" — this will reduce moral hazard and force firms to consider consequences should they ignore prudent risk management or engage in fraudulent accounting;
• Remove the Fed's mandate to control and fix interest rates, which in itself is a source of financial instability, as it leads to excessive endogenous money creation and speculation [2] — the thriving repo markets are but one symptom of this endogenous money activity.
  
  
  

[1] Sizing the vast repo markets is a challenge. The first step is to recognize who participates in these markets and what type of repo agreement those participants enter into. The participants include Fed-approved Primary Dealers (MF Global was one), the Fed itself, and non-Primary Dealers (bank holding companies, insurance companies, etc.). Agreements fall into two general categories: tri-party and bilateral. Tri-party agreements are mediated by a custodian bank or international clearing organization, which act as agents. In the U.S., JPM and Bank of NY Mellon are the major tri-party agents. Bilateral agreements are direct between the repo buyer and seller. The NY Fed provides data on repos between Primary Dealers, which includes its own repo activity HERE, the same as the data plotted at the top. The Fed's publicly available repo activity is broken out in the Fed's H.4.1 statistical release on factors affecting reserve balances, and is a fraction of the reported Primary Dealer activity. The M3 money supply metric, which the Fed used to publish but has discontinued, included its repo activity as well as interbank repo activity. The NY Fed has started to track tri-party repo activity HERE; this data includes both Primary Dealer and non-Primary Dealer participants. When I asked the NY Fed whether their tri-party data could be broken out into PD and non-PD buckets, they told me that this granularity was not available. I also asked the NY Fed for any data they had on repos between non-PD participants, most specifically bank holding companies. They told me that an aggregate was not publicly available through them, and indicated that they do not track such data. Instead they sent me a link to a website they maintain that contains thousands of quarterly reports on bank holding companies HERE, the National Information Center (NIC). When I asked the help desk at the NIC to advise on how to access aggregate data through this site, they responded that the NIC public website did not provide this service and advised me to "check with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) at http://www.state.gov/m/a/ips/." WOW. If our U.S. regulators are this lousy about tracking and releasing aggregate data, they are indeed impotent to prevent any financial instability! The reader may note that a true market size would include Primary Dealer and non-Primary Dealer, for both tri-party and bilateral agreements. A 2008 BIS report "Development in Repo Markets During Financial Turmoil" does publish data it was able to obtain on repo activity among some 1000 bank holding companies, and that market size is nearly 30% of the huge U.S. Primary Dealer repo market. Eurozone (non-UK) repo markets are tracked by ICMA HERE, and the Bank of England tracks UK repo markets HERE. To the regulators and industry: market participants and researchers are still waiting for a clean transparent total size of the repo markets. A breakdown of collateral, rates and maturities would also be (obviously) useful to track.

[2] See "Federal Reserve Capital Management," which includes a primer on endogenous money.

Federal Reserve Capital Management

Is the Federal Reserve essentially a giant hedge fund? Can it fail?

Check out this new essay (Click Here), which explores the Fed's role within the context of financial stability/instability in markets. Included are primers on endogenous money and chaos theory vs. neoclassical models in quantitative finance.

Private Domestic Investment and Real Economic Growth: Why the Dearth?

Those connected with econometric data are all too aware of the first chart. Less attention and focus goes to the components of real gross domestic product (GDP) and their trends, particularly private domestic investment (PDI), which historically leads to real economic growth and job creation. The correlation for this comes from looking at the change in real GDP, which responds to changes in PDI [1].

The historical trend for PDI has been relatively weak and muted, despite its multiplier effects on real growth and jobs. The period of the greatest compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) in PDI since 1947 occurred from June 1992 to June 2000 (9.3%; $985B to $2.01T). At the same time, growth in government expenditures was relatively flat (1.4%). Speaking to our trade deficit crisis, net exports (exports-imports) increased negatively at a CAGR of -36.6% (-$36B to -$439B). Personal consumption grew steadily (4.2%) with real GDP growth (4.0%), confirming the moniker "consumer-driven economy."

Since the "prolific" 1992-2000 period, the trend has reversed on PDI. From June 2000 to June 2011, PDI shrank with a negative CAGR of -1.1%, and the current value is stuck at around 2001 levels. While it is true that real GDP and the components kept growing until the 2006-7 pop in the mortgage bubble, PDI has not robustly recovered since the 2008 plunge. A large contributor came from the plunge in residential fixed investment, which we may classify as synonymous with personal consumption, given the hefty progression of homebuyers and speculators that took on mortgage debt and refinancings to finance further consumption. But what about nonresidential fixed investment? Why is it not showing healthy robust growth? Embarrassingly, government expenditures have outpaced at a 1.6% CAGR, and real GDP and employment remain flat to down.

What are the plausible causes of the dearth in PDI, specifically the contributions coming from nonresidential fixed investment? I provide a list below, which is by no means complete:

• Government regulations are too many, too costly, without justifiable cost benefits
  
  • EPA, Labor Dept (employment regulations), Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, ...
• Monetary and tax policies support/induce consumption/speculation, not investment (nonresidential PDI) that leads to solid job creation
  • Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and quantitative easing (QE) induce speculation and malinvestment, distorting risk-reward
  • Significant overseas profits remain unavailable for domestic investment due to punitive corporate tax policy
  • Tax code growth has coincided with providing vote-buying tax subsides linked to consumption; increasing complexity and uncertainty in the code represent a fundamental drag on business growth
• Government expenditures crowd out PDI, and may have as damaging an effect in the future as mortgage debt consumption did in the recent past
  • Government stimuli (including subsides), social "entitlements" and welfare ($9T+ marketable Treasury debt, $5T+ non-marketable debt, $100T+ off-balance-sheet liabilities)
  • False safety in Treasuries and the sovereign credit rating

The bottom line is that unless we address the inhibitors to PDI, specifically nonresidential fixed investment, we risk stagnant growth (or worse) for the foreseeable future.

[1] The charts showing the correlated trend between real GDP and PDI, and total non-farm payroll and real GDP, are shown below:

Credit Market Redux, Copper and China

The credit markets are rumbling again, as measured by the TED (LIBOR-OIS) spread and widening credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Though the latter have been intensely worse for European debt indices over the last 3-4 months from the play-out over Greece and faltering European banks holding PIIGS sovereign debt, increasing spreads are seen across global CDS indices (Europe, NA, Asia - see Markit curves above), a potential precursor to a global slowdown.

In the initial throes of the credit market induced selloff in October 2008, certain asset classes sold off quickly with sharp declines: Emerging Market (EM) equities and debt, commodities (especially copper, gold and oil). During the month of September 2011, we've seen a similar sharp selloff in these asset classes, minus commensurate participation from oil (so far). The declines in copper have come with speculation that China and other major copper holders are dumping copper onto the open market, creating selling pressure, in anticipation of a slowdown in Chinese housing and manufacturing growth.

If these selloffs are a true reflection of a coming global slowdown, then we may anticipate lower lows in copper (a futures curve asymptote to $2 and the equity proxy FCX below $20) as well as EM equities (VWO proxy $20 range). Though oil has not participated for a variety of reasons, it too could follow, leading to sharp declines in the majors and the commodity. Gold may be the exception again this time — it reached a relative low October 24, 2008, and rebounded from there, never looking back.

The flip side is that what we are seeing is a head fake, created by selling pressure from hedging activity.

The question then becomes: what are the catalysts to sharp market reversals to the upside with a sustained rise? European debt restructuring is a foregone conclusion, and may not lead to significant sustenance, given the debt levels involved and the uncertainty and disorder within the EU in general. Another quantitative easing binge by monetary authorities may give a lift, but as we've seen, the result leads to an uptick in commodity inflation mixed with stale real growth, while promoting continued debt accumulation and preventing debt deleveraging. Negative real interest rates and economic uncertainty from regulatory, tax and fiscal policies are hampering private investment.

Given this outlook, continued volatility is the most likely outcome. Hiding out in the Treasury and muni markets may not be a panacea, given the negative real returns and the latent risks. As commodities, equity majors and proxies reach lower lows, their attractiveness to acquire and hold rises, given the probability of continued inflation growth. Disinflation from debt deleveraging (while it is allowed to occur!) provides significant opportunities.

Valuing Gold From Inflation and Money Supply Growth Rates

How much is gold worth? Is gold in a bubble? Is it undervalued, even at $1900/oz? Is the current selloff providing a buying opportunity or a reason to sell? How can we tell?

One way to value gold is to look at long-term compounded annual growth rates (CAGRs) in inflation and money supply metrics, and use those rates to calculate the future value (FV) of gold from some traded price level in the past. Since I have not seen this type of analysis anywhere, it seemed germane and useful, as gold demand in terms of traded price level responds to both inflation and money supply growth, among other factors. Not surprisingly, inflation and money supply metrics grow at different rates over different time periods, due to ebbs and flows of economic activity and Federal Reserve (Fed) monetary policy.

The table above lists CAGRs of two inflation metrics, the consumer price index (CPI) levels reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the pre-1983 BLS CPI reported by ShadowStats.com ("SGS CPI") [1]. Also shown are CAGRs for five broad money supply metrics, M2, M3 (and M3b, which is M3 calculated by other sources [2] after the Fed discontinued its M3 series in early 2006), M3c [2], MZM, and TMS [3].

The results: Gold's Aug 2011 FV based on inflation rates range from $209-$5840, and based on broad money supply growth rates range from $539-$7141. Taking a closer look, the lows of these ranges stem from a relative market low price level at the start of the compounded period, namely 1970, when gold was artificially kept at a $35 peg (the market trading price level was slightly higher, $36), and 2000, which represented a decades market low for numerous commodities such as oil and gold, due to an exceptionally stronger dollar from a short-covering rally. The consistently low FVs based on the BLS CPI CAGR, $209-$1673, can probably be thrown out, given the specious definition for the metric after 1983 [1]. That leaves a FV range of $539-$7141. The averages over all of the FVs from this set span from $1709-$2757.

As one might expect, the wider ranges for gold FVs come from the money supply metrics, especially M3c, which contains the significant effects from recent Fed monetary stimuli programs, 2007-present. M3c ~ $17.32Trillion as of Aug 2011 [2], well exceeding nominal GDP ~$14.5T. Perhaps most telling is the FV range from long-term gold price appreciation since 1925: $3174-$7141. The lower bracket here is provided by the FV from the SGS CPI inflation rate, $945.

A few notes on the growth rates. The highest rates come from SGS CPI growth from 2000-2011 and 1995-2011 (yet we were told by the gov't and the Fed that inflation was exceedingly low over these periods!), M3c from 1995-2011 (thanks to "special" Fed monetary stimulus programs), and TMS from 2000-2011. Growth in the latter, TMS, is interesting, as TMS differs from the other metrics through its inclusion of Fed special memorandum data in its monetary aggregates database that many argue should be construed as money substitutes, while it excludes less liquid substitutes that have shown downside volatility from financial instability.

This analysis provides a realization that if gold buyers specify demand through price based on historical inflation and money supply growth, gold FV price levels can easily exceed where it is currently trading, and we have a concrete series of FV price levels to measure from.

Gold buyers should keep in mind that as we have gold sell off sharply on days such as today, Sept 22, 2011, that the selloff is driven largely by margin calls as all price levels fall in a volatile trading session in the broader commodities futures and equities markets, i.e., there is sharp deleveraging leading to forced selling. If gold's long-term trend is motivated by inflation and money supply growth rates that we have outlined here, that provides a floor for the traded gold price, as the expectation is that the Fed will continue its monetary stimulus measures as the dollar strengthens and the commodity and equity markets wane.

Author's Note, 9/23/2011: As the metals market continues sharp declines on a second day of volatile trading, gold closes at ~$1643, some 13.3% below the average high close of $1895 on 9/6/2011. Gold would have to go down to ~$1335 from this average high close to equal the peak-to-trough decline experienced in 2008 (~29.5%: $1011 on 3/17/2008 down to $712.50 on 10/24/2008), a recent period of comparative selling. On a longer scale, gold selloffs exceeding the 2008 decline occurred between 1980-1982 (~65.1%: $850 on 1/21/1980 down to $297 on 6/18/1982) and 1983-1985 (~44.2%: $509 on 2/15/1993 down to $284 on 2/25/1985). A 65% decline from $1900 is $663, below the lowest low of the FVs based on the SGS CPI CAGR shown in the above table. The 2008 and 1980-82 declines resulted in sharp reversals, while the 1983-1985 decline didn't yield any significant price appreciation until gold hit a multi-decade low in July 1999 ($252) after meandering around a average price of $355 (sigma ~ $52) between 1985-2004, before taking off in 2005.

[1] The SGS CPI mimics the inflation metric reported by the BLS before 1983. Starting in 1983, the BLS CPI was changed to de-emphasize food and energy inflation and allow for hedonic adjustments and substitutions, among other changes. The SGS CPI tracks the original definition, which maintains a measure of the cost of living needed to maintain a constant standard of living. HERE is a great article discussing just how misleading the current BLS CPI is. 
[2] M3b is estimated by NowandFutures.com HERE. M3c is essentially M3b on steroids: it includes the money supply growth estimated from the Fed's various special liquidity and monetary easing programs since 2007, namely TAF, PDCF & TSLF, QE,... .
[3] TMS is "true money supply," which is M2 minus small time deposits and retail/institutional money funds, plus demand and time/savings deposits due to foreign banks/institutions, U.S. gov't demand/note balances at banks and depositories, and U.S. gov't general account balances at the Fed. TMS seeks to track standard money plus money substitutes ("perfectly secure and immediately convertible, par value claims to standard money"). Up-to-date TMS is tracked HERE. Whether TMS is better and more accurate than M2 or M3 or MZM at tracking broad money supply will be discussed in a later article.

 

Global Debt Watch: $95T and Counting

As of Dec 2010, worldwide marketable/tradable debt outstanding neared some USD$95Trillion, according to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The historical data above indicates that debt markets have more than doubled from Dec 2002 to Dec 2010, with the largest increases stemming from domestic issuances, at first (2002-2007) from mortgage and asset-backed security issuances, and then more recently (since 2008), from sovereign government issuances. The United States maintains the largest debt market, at some $32.5T, ~35% of the worldwide total market [1].

Gauging and tracking marketable/tradable debt is key to understanding global capital market stability. Though total debt levels can also contain "nonmarketable" debt, such as nonmarketable sovereign government debt, it is the marketable debt that has the greater systemic influence across debt, equity and derivatives markets, since market participants price and trade that debt; however, the influence of nonmarketable debt levels should not be understated. I have started to maintain a "Global Debt Watch" page HERE, with the intent of providing historical trends and data analysis at regular intervals from a variety of international sources.

The fantastic growth in the debt markets has been assisted by three primary factors: (a) the reduced borrowing costs made possible by central bank monetary easing policies worldwide; (b) the aggressive use of short-term funding markets, such as the repurchase agreement (repo) and commercial paper (CP) markets, to borrow cash short and buy longer-dated, higher-yielding debt; (c) government policies that promote debt issuance, and government-sponsored entities (GSEs) that "back" such issuances. Government sanctioned credit rating agencies have also been a factor in the growth of debt markets.

The growth and decline of the repo and CP markets in the last decade coincide with that of the growth and decline of mortgage and asset-backed securities (MBS/ABS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), structured pools of MBS/ABS. The total repo market size between the two largest markets, U.S. and Europe, stood at approximately $12.6T Dec 2010, after falling from a 2008 high of $17.5T [2]. Unlike the CP markets, the repo markets are not reported in the BIS debt data above; repo markets are (usually) very fluid, with the majority of transactions composed of overnight or very short-term maturities. The relative opacity of repo markets, plus their vulnerability to liquidity issues due to collateral quality, counterparty risk and capital cushions, make tracking these markets imperative to gauging stability and "systemic risk." Conceivably, the more transparency in the repo markets, the better able the system would be to handling (greater) market liquidity dislocations, such as that experienced from the credit crisis of 2007/8. However, such transparency does not solve the problem of debt accumulation sponsored by central bank monetary and sovereign government fiscal policies.

[1] The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Assoc. (SIFMA) estimates U.S. debt markets at $35.5T, ~37% of the total worldwide market. SIFMA includes offshore centers and CDOs issued in USD.
[2] I assembled these estimates from two sources, the NY Federal Reserve (Fed) and the International Capital Market Association (ICMA). The NY Fed data only reports primary dealer repos, from a survey of Fed primary dealers, and does not count private OTC repos handled by bank holding companies. That may likely increase the U.S. total by some 30%, according to BIS.

 

Global Derivatives Watch: Netting, Collateral and Capital Cushions Matter

In an attempt to demystify the derivatives markets, which have endured an abundancy of malign from both somewhat credible and uninformed critics, I have started to maintain a "Global Derivatives Watch" page HERE, with the intent of providing historical trends of these complex markets along with data analysis at regular intervals. Not only do I trade these markets (namely the options, futures and forex markets), but I see enormous value in derivatives to (a) hedge risks with a defined loss and (b) place bets with a defined loss, when structured properly and controlled with defendable margins and prudent capital controls.

The first fallacy that pervaded the derivatives markets, only to lead to the road to ruin for certain participants in these markets, was that there was ever such a construct as "risk free." Let me assure you that there is nothing of the sort. The second fallacy was that due diligence was not necessary on the derivatives counterparties with which a participant executes a trade, particularly of the sort that includes high leverage or risky collateral, and also particularly on custom over-the-counter (OTC) contracts that don't trade through a clearinghouse or on an exchange. Most equity, futures and forex options and forwards trade on exchanges and have benefitted from the transparency and liquidity. Nearly half of all interest rate swaps (IRS), the largest derivatives market by almost an order of magnitude over all the others in terms of gross market exposure, are cleared through a central clearinghouse, where netting and collateral control can be verified. To be sure, there are many specialized, one-off OTC derivatives that will still be executed between parties directly or through a dealer, but that doesn't minimize the importance in netting, monitoring of underlying or backing collateral quality and value, and capital cushions should a trade go south. (The poster child for failure to execute these tenants is AIG, which should have never been bailed out for its incompetence and risk mismanagement.)

As I like to say, derivatives don't bankrupt people, people bankrupt people. (Sound familiar?)

As the chart above shows, the derivatives markets have grown exponentially over the last two decades, signifying the demand for the ability to hedge and define risks. Much of this demand is due to heightened risks in markets that result from uncertainties in macroeconomic factors, such as interest rate risk, foreign exchange rate risk, systemic default/credit risk, and futures curve (commodity price) risk. Though the credit default swaps (CDS) markets have taken the brunt of the criticisms from an array of punditry, and have spawned one too many sensational bestsellers filled with overblown rhetoric, these instruments do serve a purpose in hedging both macro and microeconomic risks, particularly specific to securities, indexes of securities, companies, institutions and governments.

Just so I don't come off as a rep for one of the industry or lobby groups for derivatives, I will provide my own criticisms of the derivatives markets thus: not everything is known about these markets to gauge systemic stability in the event of gross risk shocks (dislocations) that in turn might bring about market liquidity issues (i.e., selling panic) and lead to serious market degradation and inadvertent losses. Of particular interest is the study of interest rate swaps when rates correct markedly higher or experience extreme volatility, as a result of market panic and inviting more market panic. Understanding the vulnerabilities in markets (not just derivatives, but also equity and debt/bond markets) is valuable and the role of market transparency, disclosure and visibility critical to the task.